
I've always been under the impression that Thomas Khun's
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (
TSSR; 1962; University of Chicago Press) was a controversial book. For those unaware, this is the book wherein the author argued that science 'progressed' through 'paradigm shifts' - that is to say that most legitimate science takes place within a given accepted paradigm (e.g., the Earth is the center of the universe), until the weight of observations leads to a crisis (e.g., astronomical observations disagree with expectations), which results in a series of alternative paradigms being proposed until one is eventually accepted (e.g., heliocentrism). The cycle then begins anew.
Using this paraphrased formulation of Kuhn's model, I don't think anyone would have a problem with it, and for the first 120 pages of a ~200 page book, neither did I. It's what happens towards the end of the book that I think many people have taken issue with, including myself.
To begin with the author has a very nebulous application of his concept of paradigms
1. Paradigms are defined at least 22 different ways within the book (I didn't count, it's discussed in the postscript), which makes it difficult to nail down what a paradigm shift actually is. A paradigm isn't strictly the current framework of our understanding of a topic (models, laws, constants, forlmulae, etc.), it also has a behavioral component. Scientists raised within a given paradigm do not switch to a new one easily - if ever - and thus a current false paradigm will accrue large numbers of
ad hoc/
post hoc elements to explain away all of its inconsistencies.
Kuhn essentially argues that paradigm shifts do not equal progress. Towards the end, the book falls over the edge of relativism, where it becomes clear that since there will inevitably be a paradigm shift again, there's no way to know that this paradigm will be better than the last. The only way that
TSSR is able to get away with such an argument is by very cursorily panning Popper's doctrine of falsifiability - something that I must admit did not sit right with me. I need to elaborate on this point in order to make this clear:
According to Popper, no scientific theory is ever 'proven', rather the strength of a theory relies on its ability to resist falsification. Every time a prediction made by the theory is verified, we become a bit more confident in its validity - though it could ultimately turn out to be false in the end. Thus the relative 'value' of a scientific theory lies in its ability to make predictions. A theory that makes no predictions is unfalsifiable, and thus useless. Theories that make more predictions, if those are then verified, are more valuable than those that make fewer predictions, because they necessarily explain more about the nature of reality.
Now, there's a cagey aspect to Popper's doctrine that has to do with what happens to a scientific theory when its predictions are falsified. The theory is supposed to be rejected, but in practice it's often not necessary to reject the entire theory, but rather re-evaluate the components that fail to agree with observation. This is where Kuhn dismisses Popper's doctrine because, according to him, one can always propose
ad hoc adjustments to a theory until it falls in line with observation. Thus paradigms cannot truly be evaluated on their ability to make predictions.
If we could interpret Kuhn's paradigms in a Popperian framework, we could argue that the progress of science generally leads to theories that explain more of the universe and thus make more predictions. Thus, any new paradigm would have many more observations to account for, and thus the likelihood of new major paradigm shifts decreases with time, which can be interpreted as 'progress'. Kuhn however, argues (if I understand correctly) that because any theory can be made to fit observations with sufficient
ad and post hoc tweaking, we cannot really be sure that there's actually any progress being made.
It's actually quite difficult to read a book with this sort of defeatist(?), relativistic philosophy because it seems to ignore the practical observation that what we think we know about the universe in modern times actually allows us to do more things than we could in the past. It's sometimes frustrating to see Kuhn pick particular examples to bolster his points. Lack of progress, for instance is illustrated by explaining that Pliny's epicycles and Copernicus' heliocentrism made the same predictions. Is this really the norm?
Overall, I think that Kuhn's concept (vague as it is) of paradigms is incredibly useful in understanding the history of science. However, I think that he goes quite far in interpreting the consequences of his paradigms when it comes to the progress of science. Taken at face value, we're told a lot of odd things such as people operating within a given paradigm cannot communicate with those operating within another, that new paradigms aren't necessarily based on evidence, or that progress is illusory, etc.
TSSR is an immensely interesting book, but it veers into very controversial lines of reasoning when it reaches its more 'psychological' claims.
I don't know if anyone's doing this, but I think it would be very useful to get the perspective of scientists who lived through paradigm changes, in order to see if some of Kuhn's behavioral hypotheses are valid. Thinking about past paradigm shifts is interesting, but understanding more current ones, if they're occurring, may be more informative.
1This is something that Kuhn himself admits in the postscript to the book, published 7 years after the 1st edition. He doesn't think it changes the veracity of his model, however.
Labels: Book Club, Science